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Abstract: This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of diiferent assumptions 
about precommitment in a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing. Assuming that 
demands are linear, we find that the optimal first-period subsidy is increasing in the rate of 
learning with precommitment but decreasing in i t i f the government cannot precommit to future 
subsidies. The infant-industry argument is thus reversed in the absence of precommitment. 
I I N T R O D U C T I O N 
I n oligopolistic industr ies when pure profits are being made, govern­ments typical ly have an incentive to employ a strategic trade policy. This 
involves precommitment to subsidies or tariffs tha t are designed to shift rents 
to home f i rms or to the government itself. However, i f f i rms move before 
governments they may be able to influence the government's policy choices. I t 
has been shown by de Meza (1986) and Neary (1994) that , i f an export sub­
sidy is opt imal , governments should offer larger subsidies to lower-cost f irms. 
I f f i rms can influence the i r costs i n advance they can then influence the 
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op t ima l subsidy t h a t they receive. As noted by Leahy (1992), f i rms t h a t 
experience l ea rn ing by doing can benefit by p laying strategically against 
governments for higher subsidies. 
This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of different 
assumptions about precommitment and the t i m i n g of moves i n a dynamic 
oligopoly game w i t h learning by doing. Similar issues of t i m i n g and precom­
mi tmen t have been much discussed i n the macroeconomics l i tera ture under 
the t i t l e of t ime consistency. This paper is among the f i rs t to discuss such 
issues i n the context of microeconomic pol icy . 1 
Learn ing by doing has often been cited as a just if icat ion for infant-industry 
protection. The t rad i t iona l infant- industry argument i n a competitive context 
relies on the existence of an addi t ional d is tor t ion such as capital-market 
imperfections or positive externalit ies generated by the protected industry . 
Our concern here is whether the existence of learning by doing strengthens 
the case for strategic trade policy and to what extent different move orders 
affect the government's opt imal policy. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I I sets up the basic two-period 
export subsidy model w i t h l ea rn ing by doing and explains the different 
assumptions made about the t i m i n g of moves. Section I I I considers the 
benchmark case where governments and firms precommit i n the f i rs t period 
to the i r second-period output and subsidy levels. I n Section I V we examine a 
model i n w h i c h f i rms and governments are unable to precommit to future 
actions. We regard th is "time-consistent" case as both more interest ing and 
more plausible thain the benchmark precommitment equi l ibr ium. Section V is 
a short conclusion. 
I I T H E M O D E L 
This model bui lds on Brander and Spencer (1985), extending i t to two 
periods l i nked by learning by doing. Period 1 is the infant phase i n which the 
home indus t ry is l ea rn ing whi le period 2 represents the mature phase i n 
wh ich a l l l ea rn ing has ceased. Assume a single home f i r m wh ich produces 
outputs X! and x 2 i n periods 1 arid 2 respectively and m symmetric foreign 
f irms each of wh ich produces y i and y 2 . The number of foreign f irms is fixed 
and aggregate foreign outputs are represented by = m y i and Y 2 = m y 2 i n 
each period. We assume tha t f i rms play Cournot and sell a homogeneous 
commodity on a t h i r d market where they face a t ime-invariant l inear demand 
function: 
p t = a - b ( x t + Y t ) t = L 2 
1. See also Maskin and Newbery (1990). 
where a and b are constants. 
The home f i r m has constant marginal cost c x = c i n period 1 but i ts second-
period marginal cost falls i n first-period output: 
c 2 = c - ^ x 1 , (2) 
where X is a positive constant. The foreign firms are assumed to have reached 
m a t u r i t y before period 1 and have constant margina l cost c* i n both periods. 
A l l f i rms maximise the discounted sum of first- and second-period profits. For 
the home f i r m this is: 
7X = 7C 1 + p 7 t 2 , n t = ( p t - c t + s t ) x t , t = L 2 , (3) 
where p is the discount factor and s t i s the subsidy set by the home 
government i n period t . (We assume throughout tha t the foreign government 
does not offer a subsidy.) The home government maximises the discounted 
sum of first- and second-period welfare. Period-t welfare, as i n Brander and 
Spencer (1985), equals profits less subsidy payments: 
W = W 1 + P W 2 , 
W t = 7 t t - s t x t = ( p t - c t ) x t . 
We assume intratemporal precommitment by the government throughout, i n 
the sense t h a t i t commits to i t s period-t subsidy before f i rms choose the i r 
period-t outputs. However we consider two al ternat ive assumptions about 
intertemporal precommitment g iv ing rise to two different equi l ibr ia , wh ich 
are referred to as the precommitment equilibrium and the sequence equi­
librium respectively. I n the precommitment e q u i l i b r i u m a l l agents take 
decisions for both periods at the s tar t of period 1. Tha t is, they precommit 
inter temporal ly . By contrast, i n the sequence equ i l ib r ium no agent can pre­
commit inter temporal ly. I n each period the government f i rs t sets i ts subsidy 
and the firms then set thei r outputs. 
I l l T H E P R E C O M M I T M E N T E Q U I L I B R I U M 
This is modelled as a two-stage game i n which the government chooses i ts 
first- and second-period subsidies i n the first stage and the f irms choose thei r 
outputs i n the second stage. Fol lowing standard practice the game is solved 
by backward induction. I n the second stage the home f i r m chooses x x and x 2 to 
maximise the profit function (3) while a representative foreign f i r m chooses y x 
and y 2 to maximise n = j i 1 + p7X2- The period-t f irst-order condi t ion for a 
typical foreign firm is p t - c - b y t = 0. A n explicit expression for the foreign 
reaction function can be obtained by using (1) i n this first-order condition to 
obtain: 
b Y t = m b y t = — m — ( a - c * - b x t ) . (5) 
m + l v ' 
The second-period first-order condition for the home firm is: 
p 2 - c 2 + s 2 - b x 2 = 0. (6) 
W h e n choosing i t s f i rs t -per iod output the home firm mus t take in to 
account the effect of f irst-period output on i t s second-period marg ina l cost. 
The first-period first-order condition is: 
——• = — i + p—2- —-2- = p 1 - c + s 1 - b x 1 + pAx 2 = 0 . (7) 
dx1 dxx dc 2 dx j 
Compared to the home firm's second-period first-order condition and the first-
order conditions of the foreign firms, there is an addit ional t e rm i n X on the 
r igh t -hand side of (7). This addi t ional t e r m is positive and i t implies t h a t 
marg ina l revenue is set below marg ina l cost i n the first period. The home 
f i r m has an incent ive to produce beyond the poin t of shor t - run prof i t -
maximisa t ion i n order to move down its learning curve and further reduce i ts 
second-period cosies. The home and foreign first-order conditions can now be 
solved simultaneously to show tha t the two home outputs are completely 
determined by the two subsidies. 
We t u r n next to the first stage of the game. The home government moves 
first, choosing the first- and second-period subsidies i n the knowledge of how 
home and foreign outputs w i l l respond. Given tha t the two home outputs 
depend only on the subsidies they can be controlled directly. Therefore, i t is 
possible to model Ithe government's problem as one of choosing xx and x 2 i n 
order to maximise welfare. The two first-order conditions are: 
d W
 u L d Y i l , ( i ) - — = p 1 - c - b x 1 U + — i U p X x 2 
d * ! I d x j 
= a - c - b x i ( 2 5 ^ - ) - b Y 1 + p X x 2 = 0 . 
• { m + l j 
dW , L d Y 2 ( i i ) - — = p 2 - c 2 - b x 2 U + d x , dx 2 
: a - c - b x 2 <{ 2 - j - b Y 2 + ?cXl = 0. 
M a k i n g use of the home f irm's f irst-order conditions yields the fo l lowing 
expression for the opt imal subsidies: 
s°t=-^-bxt t = l , 2 . (9) 
m + 1 
This is identical i n form to the opt imal subsidy i n the static Brander-Spencer 
game. Learning by doing i n the precommitment equi l ib r ium alters the value 
of the opt imal subsidy (since output x t is higher). However, i t does not change 
the basis for in tervent ion, wh ich continues to be one of reducing the home 
firm's costs i n order to shift profits towards i t and away from the foreign f i r m . 
To obtain explicit expressions for outputs substitute (9) in to the firm's f i r s t -
order conditions and solve to obtain: 
, 2 + (m + l ) p Y . , 2 + (m + l ) y . 
bx j = — <(>, b x 2 = L<|). (10) 
Here y equals X/b, the rate of learning normalised by the size of the market ; <|> 
equals a-(m+l)c+mc*, a measure of the cost-competitiveness of the home 
f i r m ; and A equals 4 - ( m + l ) 2 p y 2 , which must be positive for s tabi l i ty . F rom 
(10), outputs and hence the opt imal subsidies are clearly increasing i n the 
rate of learning. F ina l ly , the envelope theorem can be used to demonstrate 
tha t welfare is also increasing i n learning: 
d w a w .
 M 1 , 
— = — = p X l x 2 > 0 . (11) 
Summaris ing these results: 
Propos i t ion 1 : W i t h l inear demands and l inear learning and when a l l f i rms 
and the government can precommit to future actions, the op t imal f i rs t - and 
second-period subsidies, f irst- and second-period outputs and welfare are a l l 
increasing i n the rate of learning. 
I V SEQUENCE E Q U I L I B R I U M 
I n th is section we consider the four-stage game i n w h i c h no agent can 
precommit in ter temporal ly . The second period is j u s t a s tandard Brander-
Spencer game w i t h many foreign f i rms i n w h i c h the home government 
commits to i t s subsidy-before the firms move. The second-period first-order 
conditions for the firms are the same as i n the previous section. Thus second-
period output of the foreign firms is given by (5) for the case of t=2. Use (1) 
and (5) i n the home firm's second-period first-order condition to obtain: 
_<t> + (m + l ) O x 1 + s 2 ) 
x 2 TTt—77T\ • ^12^ 
b(m + 2) 
Given x 1 ; the home government can control x 2 by choice of s 2, and i ts second -
period f irst-order condi t ion takes the form of (8(ii)) . The op t imal second-
period subsidy is thus given by (9) for the case of t=2. The use of (12) i n (9) 
yields: 
s o ^ i + m ^ ( 1 3 ) 
2
 m + 1 2 2 1 
This can be viewed as the government's reaction function. A n increase i n x1 
leads to an increase i n s 2 , since i t leads to lower costs i n period 2 and thus 
increases the hoiiie government's ab i l i ty to raise welfare by subsidising the 
f i r m i n tha t period. 
We t u r n now to the f i rs t period. I n stage 2 of the game the f i rms choose 
the i r f i rs t-period > outputs. The foreign first-order conditions take the same 
form as i n the previous section, and foreign output, wh ich depends only on 
home output , is represented as before by (5). The home f irm's first-order 
condition is now: 
dxc d 7 i 2 _ 
~T~ = T ^ + P t ^ = 0 ' ( 1 4 ) axy dx1 ax1 
where the to ta l effect of current output on future profits includes the direct 
effect of cost changes as we l l as the indirect effects work ing th rough both 
future ou tpu t and the future subsidy. Fol lowing some manipulat ions th i s 
yields: 
, - I , . d Y o d x o ] ds 2 „ 
— — = p 1 - c + s 1 - b x 1 + p A x 2 U + b - ^ — ^ + p x 2 3 - ^ = 0. (15) 
ax1 [ d x 2 dc 2 J ax1 
C o m p a r i n g t h i s to the corresponding fo rmula i n the p recommi tmen t 
e q u i l i b r i u m (7), it; is clear tha t (15) has two addit ional terms. The second 
t e r m i n chain brackets is positive and i t shows tha t the home f i r m has a 
greater incentive to produce beyond the point of short-run profi t maximis­
at ion i n order to induce the foreign f irms to produce less i n period 2 and thus 
raise the second-period profits of the home f i rm . This strategic incentive was 
f i rs t noted by Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). The f inal t e rm on the r ight -hand 
side wh ich is also positive represents the home firm's strategic incentive to 
produce more i n order to raise the second-period subsidy. The use of the 
foreign f i rms ' second-period reaction function (5) and the government reaction 
function (13) allows the following considerable simplification of (15): 
a - c + sj - 2 b x a - b Y j + pl(m + l ) x 2 = 0. (16) 
I t is now possible to el iminate Y j and x 2 us ing (5), (12) and (13), and so 
demonstrate tha t X! depends only on Sj and parameters. I n the f i rs t stage the 
government chooses Si to maximise welfare. Since Xi depends on Si alone the 
problem can be modelled as one i n w h i c h the government chooses home 
output before foreign firms move. The relevant first-order condit ion for the 
government is (8(i)). The use of (16) i n (8(i)) gives: 
Si = —™— b X i - m p ^ X g . (17) 
m + 1 
To obtain explici t formulae for home output i n the first and second periods, 
substitute s° and s 2 in to the home firm's first- and second-period first-order 
conditions and combine w i t h (5). The resu l t ing expressions are ident ica l to 
those i n (10). I t is then s t ra ightforward to derive explici t formulae for the 
opt imal first- and second-period subsidies. The expression for s 2 is ident ical 
to tha t i n the precommitment equi l ibr ium and the formula for s° is: 
0 ^ m [ 2 - ( m + l ) p Y [ l + ( m - r l ) Y ] 
S l _ m + l l A 
So, i n the sequence equ i l i b r ium, outputs i n both periods and the second-
period subsidy are the same as i n the precommitment equi l ibr ium. However, 
a comparison of (9) and (17) reveals t h a t the f i rs t -per iod subsidy under 
sequence equ i l i b r ium is lower t han t h a t under precommitment . Moreover, 
f rom (18), the op t imal first-period subsidy i n the sequence e q u i l i b r i u m is 
decreasing i n the ra te of learn ing . Welfare is the same i n the sequence 
equ i l ib r ium as i t is i n the precommitment equ i l ib r ium since i t depends only 
on outputs. Summaris ing these results: 
Propos i t ion 2 : W i t h l inear demands and l inear learning and when no agents 
can precommit to future actions, the opt imal second-period subsidies, f i rs t-
and second-period outputs and welfare are a l l increasing i n the ra te of 
learning. However, the opt imal first-period subsidy is decreasing i n the rate 
of learning. 
The first-period subsidy may actual ly be negative i n the sequence equi­
l i b r i u m . 
The results for op t imal subsidies i n period 1 are i l lus t ra ted i n Figures 1 
and 2, where the horizontal axis measures the value of Y, the normalised rate 
of l ea rn ing . ( U n i t s of measurement for the subsidies are chosen such 
(18) 
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Figure 1: Sensitivity of Optimal Subsidies to Discount Rate. 
(One foreign firm; optimal one-period subsidy normalised to equal one) 
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normalised rate of learning (gamma) 
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of Optimal Subsidies to Number of Foreign Firms. 
(No discounting; optimal one-period subsidy with one foreign firm normalised to equal one) 
t ha t the static Brander-Spencer value equals un i ty . ) Figure 1 considers the 
case of only one foreign f i r m ( m = l ) . The opt imal subsidy is increasing i n y i f 
precommitment is possible and decreasing i n y otherwise, w i t h both becoming 
less sensitive to y as the future is discounted more heavily. Figure 2 fixes the 
discount factor at un i ty and considers the effects of increasing the number of 
foreign f i rms. The same qual i ta t ive conclusions hold, w i t h bo th subsidies 
becoming more sensitive to y as the number of foreign f irms increases. 
Note tha t the first-period subsidy is lower t han the second-period subsidy 
i n the sequence equ i l ib r ium. This is somewhat surpr i s ing given t h a t the 
home f i r m is learn ing i n the f i rs t period but not i n the second. I t therefore 
runs counter to i n t u i t i o n derived from a t r ad i t iona l in fan t - indus t ry argu­
ment. Comparing Propositions 1 and 2 i t is clear t ha t the extent of precom­
mi tmen t is crucial for the results. I f the government cannot precommit, the 
infant- industry argument is reversed. 
V C O N C L U D I N G REMARKS 
This paper has examined the implications for a strategic export subsidy of 
different assumptions about precommitment. I n a l inear Cournot model we 
found tha t the op t imal f irs t-period subsidy is lower i f the f i rms and the 
government cannot precommit to future actions t han i f they can and tha t the 
opt imal subsidy is increasing i n learning w i t h precommitment but decreasing 
i n the sequential case. A n impor t an t policy lesson of our results is tha t , 
compared to a static model or one i n which agents can precommit to the i r 
future actions, the inabi l i ty of government to precommit may actually reverse 
the sign of op t imal policy. This is because a pr ivate sector agent has an 
incentive to take actions i n the present wh ich w i l l increase the subsidy i t 
receives i n the fu ture . To counteract th i s social ly wasteful s trategic 
behaviour, the government has an incentive to tax ra ther t han subsidise the 
agent i n the present. 
The results of this paper are restricted to the case of l inear demands and 
linear learning. I n a companion paper, Leahy and Neary (1994), we show tha t 
the results continue to hold under more general assumptions. I n future work 
we hope to apply the insights from the learning by doing case to examine the 
role of precommitment i n affecting opt imal policy choice i n the presence of 
other dynamic phenomena, including capacity choice, investment i n research 
and development and na tu ra l resource exploi tat ion. Just as the debate on 
t ime consistency has caused a major r e t h i n k of policy issues i n macro­
economics, so the study of precommitment promises to throw new l igh t on the 
costs and benefits of microeconomic policy i n dynamic environments. 
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